'Happiness' has often been translated in to Eudaimonia. As, we shall later see, these objections can be overcome once one truly grasps the necessary relationship between intellectual virtue with the other virtues - to the extent that one understands how both sets of virtues need not contradict, but instead rely upon each other.Īn understanding of the supreme good, or 'happiness' as Aristotle names it, is necessary before any enquiry. There are, however, less fundamental objections which could be raised by opponents of Aristotle's view. This is the main source of tension to be found in this account. Essentially, Aristotle, at times, espouses an exclusive picture of how to reach eudaimonia, which is solely dependent on contemplative activities - whereas, occasionally he appears to be arguing that whilst the contemplative (intellectual) virtue is important, eudaimonia is contingent on this intellectual virtue overlapping with a variety of other virtues. This tension refers to the apparently contradictive held views taken by Aristotle: where, on one hand, he claims that it is the solely the contemplative life which enables one to live an eudaimon life, and on the other hand he appears to be arguing the eudaimonia is fulfilled when one exhibits a range of different virtues in addition to that of the contemplative life.
"Does Aristotle show in Book X that contemplative activity meets the conditions of eudaimonia set out in Book I better than ethically virtuous activity? Does Aristotle's appeal to divine happiness support his account of human happiness, or undermine it?"Īccording to some commentators of the Nicomachean Ethics, there remains an integral tension between two (arguably) different theories, both embraced by Aristotle.
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